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Issue 2

COURTREPORTS

the Corps' motion for summary judgment. The Foundation appealed
the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, which upheld the district court's decision, but for different
reasons.
On appeal, the Third Circuit first noted that WRDA requires the
Corps to include environmental protection as one of its primary
purposes in operating and maintaining its water resource projects.
The Foundation argued that the Corps violated this statute because
the Corps emphasized flood control and not fishery management as
the primary purpose of the Walter Dam Reservoir. However, the court
found Congress did not give the Corps specific instructions to carry
out this objective; therefore, the Corps retained a great deal of
discretion to determine where, when, and how much of WRDA's
environmental protection mission to implement at a given water
resources project. After determining that the Corps' actions were
indeed subject to judicial review, the court held that the Corps
satisfactorily demonstrated that it made environmental protection a
primary mission, and its actions were not arbitrary and capricious. The
court then held that the Corps included environmental protection in
its overall operation of its water resource projects, and more
specifically, at the Walter Dam.
In sum, the Third Circuit held the district court erred in finding
that the Corps' actions were not subject to judicial review. However,
Congress gave the Corps a vast amount of discretion to implement
environmental protection as one of the primary Corps' missions in
regards to water resources projects.
Therefore, that the Corps
emphasized flood control and not fishery management as the primary
objective of the Walter Dam Reservoir did not mean that it violated the
WRDA. Thus, the court held the Corps' decision was subject to
judicial review; however, it affirmed the district court's decision due to
the discretion afforded the Corps.
BrettJohnson

FOURTH CIRCUIT
Treacy v. Newdunn Assocs., 344 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding
that, for purposes of the Clean Water Act, the United States Army
Corps of Engineers had jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to
nonnavigable tributaries of navigable waters, and that a man-made
ditch was a "tributary").
The United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") brought an
action against Newdunn Associates, Orion Associates, and Northwest
Contractors (collectively "Newdunn") to enjoin them from draining
certain lands in alleged violation of the wetlands provision of the
Clean Water Act ("CWA"). The Virginia State Water Control Board
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("Board") brought a separate action in state court, the Circuit Court
for the City of Newport News, Virginia, which Newdunn removed to
the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ("district
court"). The district court consolidated the two actions and denied
the Board's motion to remand its case back to the trial court. Finding
that the Corps and the Board both lacked jurisdiction over the
Newdunn property under the CWA, the district court ruled against
each in favor of Newdunn. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, finding that the district court did not have
jurisdiction over the Board's action, and that the Corps did, in fact,
have the asserted jurisdiction over the Newdunn property.
Newdunn owned a parcel of land in Virginia, the majority of which
The
was undisputedly "wetlands," as defined under the CWA.
Newdunn wetlands drained into a man-made ditch that, in turn,
drained into Stony Run, a navigable water-in-fact of the United States,
also as defined under the CWA. Although formerly linked by a natural
waterway, the wetlands and Stony Run, after construction of an
interstate highway, were now connected by the man-made ditch. The
Corps and the Board each attempted to assert jurisdiction over the
Newdunn property in order to prevent Newdunn from discharging siltladen waters into navigable waters without a permit. When Newdunn
rejected the Corps' jurisdiction and ignored an order issued by the
Board, both agencies brought actions asserting jurisdiction.
The Board brought its action in the state circuit court but
Newdunn removed it to the federal district court. The district court
took jurisdiction over the action based on federal question
jurisdiction. Finding the state action turned on the definition of
wetlands, which was common to both the state and federal statutes, the
district court reasoned it had subject matter jurisdiction, since the
federal definition controlled. The court reversed, finding the two
statutes' common definition served to scientifically define a wetland,
rather than to confer jurisdiction. Since the parties agreed the
property contained scientific wetlands, as defined under the CWA,
there was no disputed federal question, and no federal jurisdiction.
The court therefore remanded the Board's action to state court.
Turning to the Corps' assertion of jurisdiction over the Newdunn
property, the court noted first that the Corps had statutory authority to
require and issue permits for the discharge of dredge and fill material
into navigable waters under Section 404 of the CWA. Under the
Supreme Court case United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., the
Corps also had authority to exercise jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent
to other waters. The Supreme Court came to this conclusion in
deference to the Corps' own determination that wetlands adjacent to
other waters should be subject to its CWA permitting authority, since
wetlands might function as integral parts of neighboring aquatic
systems. The Court held the Corps had jurisdiction over navigable
waters, tributaries to navigable waters, and wetlands adjacent to either.
While jurisdiction over waters having no connection to navigable or
interstate waters would overreach the authority Congress could
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delegate to the Corps under the Commerce Clause, the Court held the
Corps did have jurisdiction over waters with a sufficient hydrological
connection to navigable waters.
Thus, the Corps' jurisdiction could therefore reach any branch of
a tributary system that eventually flowed into a navigable body of water
or a water of the United States, and any wetland adjacent thereto.
Since the Newdunn wetlands were adjacent to the nonnavigable ditch
that drained into the navigable waters of Stony Run, the last question
was whether the ditch constituted a tributary of Stony Run. Noting
that rerouting the ditch did not meaningfully alter the wetlands'
longstanding connection to Stony Run, and that the Corps' definition
of "tributary" included roadside ditches, the court rejected Newdunn's
asserted distinction between natural and man-made watercourses for
purposes of defining "tributary."
Therefore, the Newdunn wetland was adjacent to a tributary of a
navigable water, and was subject to the Corps' jurisdiction for the
purpose of CWA permitting requirements.
Owen Walker

FIFFH CIRCUIT
In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that Oil
Pollution Act did not permit federal government to impose
regulations over tributaries that were neither themselves navigable nor
truly adjacent to navigable waters; bayou containing residue from oil
spill flowed directly into company canal that was navigable-in-fact and
was plainly adjacent to navigable waters, thus triggering federal
regulatoryjurisdiction pursuant to Oil Protection Act).
The United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and
Coast Guard (collectively "United States") filed suit against James and
Janell Needham ("Needhams") for reimbursement of cleanup costs
associated with an oil spill. The United States Bankruptcy Court
("bankruptcy court") for the Western District of Louisiana found that
the Needhams were not liable to the United States for the cleanup
costs because the waters in question were not navigable, and were
therefore beyond the reach of the Oil and Pollution Act ("OPA").
After the United States District Court for the Western District of
Louisiana affirmed, the United States appealed the decision to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit which reversed
and remanded the lower court decisions.
On January 25, 1995, an employee of Needham Resources, Inc.
("NRI"), owned by the Needhams, pumped oil into a drainage ditch.
Initially, NRI hired a private contractor to clean the spill, but lacked
the financial resources to complete the effort. The United States
finished the cleanup effort, expending $207,000. On February 8,

